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Logo após ter estabelecido dois conselhos presidenciais, o presidente dos Estados Unidos Donald 
Trump anunciou a destituição daqueles em agosto de 2017, na sequência de declarações públicas e 
renúncias de vários membros dos conselhos. Com base no estudo do mercado financeiro, as reações 
dos investidores a estes acontecimentos foram analisadas. No entanto, os resultados apresentados na 
presente tese demonstram que as reações dos investidores aos eventos não foram significativas. A 
principal descoberta neste estudo é o facto de as reações por parte dos investidores não terem sido 
significativamente afetadas pelas declarações públicas, renúncias e destituições dos conselhos 
presidenciais, não se verificando efeitos de mudança no desempenho das empresas após a destituição 
dos conselhos presidenciais. 
 
Abstract (English): 
Shortly after establishing two presidential councils, US president Donald Trump announced the 
dismissals of those in August 2017, following public statements and renunciations of several council 
members. Based on a financial market event study, investors´ reactions to these events were analyzed. 
However, this master thesis finds that investor reactions to the events in presidential councils were 
not significant. The key finding of the event study is that investors reactions were not significantly 
affected by public statements, renunciations, and dismissals of presidential councils, supporting no 
firm performance effects of changes in the composition of presidential councils.  
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1. Introduction 
The debate over firms influencing politics has grown substantially in the US due to favorable 
legislative decisions, firms´ increased political expenditures, and most recently, the election of 
Donald Trump as US president. The US holds a special position regarding corporate influence in 
politics because regulations on political spending turned to be less strict compared to the international 
context. Particularly, the recent Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United vs. Federal Election 
Commission (FEC) in 2010 released strict regulations on firms´ political spending.  
 In fact, political spending in the US has been shown to increase steadily. Lobbying 
expenditures rose from USD 1.57 billion in 2000 to USD 2.43 billion in 2017 (Center for Responsive 
Politics, 2017). However, firms are not only politically active in terms of lobbying but they hold 
corporate relationships with the ruling elite. Indeed, when President Trump established two corporate 
presidential councils in January 2017, he provided firms with new political resources which extend 
conventional forms, for example lobbying.  
 From a theoretical perspective, corporate political activity (CPA) describes a firm´s decision 
to engage in politics to gain political influence and thereby leverage a potential competitive advantage 
(Shaffer, 1995). Firms may use political resources, e.g. campaign contributions, to access the political 
market and influence public policy making (Dahan, 2005). The membership in presidential councils 
provided firms with the opportunity to extend their political resources and manage the institutional 
context (Lux, Crook, & Woehr, 2011). The goal of this master thesis is to examine whether the 
councils´ opportunities translated into firm performance effects for council members based on a 
market wide event study.  
Problem description 
Connecting theory and practice, the events around presidential councils provide an opportunity to 
examine firm performance effects of non-monetary CPA, which seem to be less explored in current 
CPA literature (e.g. Lux et al., 2011). At the time of foundation, the two councils included 47 CEOs 
to advise President Trump on manufacturing growth and increased employment for the US economy. 
However, since then, an increasing number of CEOs took a stand against President Trump´s politics 
via public statements and renunciations. This gradual process was enforced by controversial policies 
(e.g. withdrawal from Paris Climate Accord) and came to an end in August, 16, 2017, when President 
Trump dissolved the two presidential councils himself: ‘Rather than putting pressure on the 
businesspeople of the Manufacturing Council & Strategy & Policy Forum, I am ending both. Thank 
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you all!’ (Trump, Twitter, 2017). However, investors as well as CPA research seem to be unclear on 
presidential councils as an extension of non-monetary CPA.  
 From a theoretical perspective, CPA research is divided on firm performance effects of CPA 
and presidential councils have not been examined yet as a form of non-monetary CPA. For a long 
time, the majority of research assumed positive firm performance effects of CPA, particularly for 
monetary forms, e.g. lobbying expenditures (e.g. Bonardi, 2006; Dorobantu, Kaul, & Zelner, 2016). 
However, positive performance effects are not as distinctive as previously claimed (e.g. Lux et al., 
2011), resulting in inconclusive firm performance effects of CPA. Another structural peculiarity in 
CPA research applies to non-monetary forms of CPA (Lux et al., 2011), which have only scarcely 
been investigated by now. Overall, prior research in CPA only rarely considered firm performance 
effects of presidential councils because the effects appeared to be less quantifiable than monetary 
forms of CPA are.  
Objective 
 This master thesis aims to fill this research gap and uses events of presidential councils to 
analyze firm performance effects of a new form of non-monetary CPA. The recent changes in 
presidential councils (i.e. corporate renunciations, public statements, and President Trump´s 
dismissal) set the opportunity to measure the performance effects of changes in the composition of 
presidential councils. Based on an event study, investor reactions to three events are analyzed: 
corporate renunciations, public statements, and the dismissals.  
From a theoretical perspective, this master thesis extends CPA research by introducing a new 
form of non-monetary CPA (i.e. presidential councils), by supporting prior research´s results of 
insignificant performance effects and by initiating and encouraging further research on firm 
performance effects of presidential councils.  
 The following section of this master thesis introduces the literature on CPA. Thereafter, the 
development of presidential councils is explained. Next, the main Hypotheses are developed. 
Following, the master thesis employs a market-wide event study to examine the relationship between 
firm returns and market returns for Hypotheses 1-4. The results of the market-wide event study show 
that investors did not react significantly to any of the events of presidential councils. Therefore, I 
cannot assume significant firm performance effects of changes in presidential councils. The last part 
of this master thesis concludes with discussion, managerial implications, limitations and suggestions 
for future research.  
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2. Literature Review 
In this master thesis, I will use contemporary nonmarket strategy literature to explain that investor’s 
reactions will be negative, on average, towards changes in the composition of presidential councils 
(i.e. Hypothesis 1). For subgroup analyses, however, I assume negative reactions to public statements 
as well as renunciations from presidential councils (i.e. Hypothesis 2, 3), and positive reactions to 
CEOs remaining in presidential councils (i.e. Hypothesis 4). 
Hadani and Schuler (2013) summarize the current status of CPA literature when they claim that ‘the 
relationship between CPA and financial performance seems to be complex and incompletely 
understood’ (p. 166). That is, a general theory combining various theoretical perspectives does not 
exist, the majority of research focuses on monetary CPA (e.g. Lux et al., 2011), and an increasing 
number of research does not support firm performance effects of CPA anymore as it finds 
inconclusive results (e.g. Aggarwal; Meschke, & Wang, 2012; Cooper; Gulen, & Ovtchinnikov, 
2010; Mellahi et al., 2016). Considering this context, this master thesis aims to fill the research gab 
by analyzing firm performance effects of non-monetary CPA (presidential councils).  
2.1 Corporate political activity 
2.1.1 Definition 
There are various options for firms to manage the corporate environment. These include instruments 
such as social marketing, philanthropy, public relations, and CPA (e.g. Deephouse, 2000; Hoeffler & 
Keller, 2002). CPA is defined as ‘actions taken in the nonmarket environment to create value by 
improving its [firm´s] overall performance’ (Oliver & Holzinger, 2008, p. 496) and by influencing 
and managing political entities (Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004). As such, CPA is embedded in 
corporate nonmarket strategy which aims to manage the competitive landscape as well as the 
corporate institutional environment (Boddewyn, 2003) to generate economic advantages (North, 
1990; Lux et al., 2011).  
2.1.2 Development 
Research finds CPA to be interesting because it can be an instrument to explain performance effects 
in the political environment across different firms and industries, driven by various characteristics 
(Hillman et al., 2004). The US political environment is particularly attractive for CPA because 
favorable legislative developments and disclosed political expenditures support firms´ political 
activities and research´s interest (Werner, 2017). Firms across different industries inherit an active 
position in the US political environment. They are from tobacco, pharmaceuticals or oil and gas, and 
aim to influence the government through lobbying, campaign contributions, agreements or political 
action committees (e.g. Delmas & Montes-Sancho, 2010; Spiller 1990; Okhmatovskiy, 2010).   
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2.1.3 Drivers 
Research assumes that corporate levels of CPA are positively driven by diverse factors. The 
attractiveness of the political market being one of them, it is assumed that an attractive political 
market increases the likelihood of successful CPA (Bonardi, Hillman, & Keim, 2005; Werner, 2017). 
However, Lux et al. (2011) claim that the firm itself (i.e. firm size) can have a significant positive 
effect on a firm´s engagement in CPA, whereas the market and industry level (i.e. industry 
concentration) are claimed less supportive in explaining a firm´s engagement in CPA. Expanding the 
two approaches, Rajwani, Lawton and McGuire (2013) consider exogenous context and shocks (e.g. 
European liberalization of telecommunications system) as drivers to adapt corporate political 
resources in order to sustain corporate competitive advantage.  
2.1.4 Advantages 
Firms´ large interest in CPA is driven by the idea to sustain corporate advantages. According to most 
research, firms´ primary goal of political actions is to obtain or maintain economic returns (e.g., 
North, 1990), with CPA to be a favorable investment option when benefits exceed costs (e.g. Baron, 
1995; Lux et al., 2011). Retaining corporate profits, firms apply political resources in order to access 
and influence the political market (Hillman & Hitt, 1999). The political market is considered an 
exchange between demand (firms) and supply (politicians) (Hillman & Keim, 1995), so that ‘… they 
[firms] must give something valued by public officials in exchange for getting favorable policies’ 
(Getz, 2002, p. 318). Additionally, ‘organizations may use political means to alter the condition of 
the external economic environment’ (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 189, 190), for example, to lower 
transaction costs, decrease environmental uncertainty, and improve sustainability in the long run 
(Hillman, Zardkoohi, & Bierman, 1999).  
 
Concluding, research outlines CPA as a powerful instrument to improve firm performance and 
influence politics in the nonmarket environment such that it provides an attractive area of research. 
This master thesis and particularly the following part shed more light into the current status of CPA 
literature.  
2.2 Categorization 
The development of CPA research is complex and inherits different perspectives. Research started 
between the 1980s and 1990s (Keim & Zeithaml, 1986; Shaffer, 1995) and Hillman and Hitt (1999) 
provided a theoretical basis which was built on by many researchers. They categorized CPA into 
general approaches, levels of participation, and political strategies. Hillman et al. (2004) expanded 
their approach with an overview of antecedents, types, and outcomes of CPA. However, no overall 
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theory on CPA emerged but rather research form multiple perspectives increased (Getz, 1997) as a 
result of ‘contexts … under which CPA is more and is less effective’ (Hadani, Bonardi, & Dahan, 
2016, p. 357). As a consequence, the following section presents CPA research from three different 
perspectives. Grounding on Dorobantu et al. (2017), Mellahi et al. (2016), and Rajwani et al. (2013), 
research on CPA mainly stems from the institutional environment, the political environment, and 
adaptive corporate resources and capabilities.   
 Concluding, CPA research inherits various perspectives to explain the link between business 
and politics. In the following, the literature review refers to three areas, reflecting the main body of 
CPA research. 
2.2.1 Institutional basis 
Studies from the institutional basis claim that firms are participants in the institutional environment 
and explain how they interact with different institutions (e.g. Hadani et al., 2016; Hillman, Whiters, 
& Collins, 2009; Jackson & Deeg, 2008; Rajwani et al., 2013; Vogel, 1996). They examine not only 
how institutional settings influence corporate government relations, but they also consider how these 
lead to adapted corporate resources. Moreover, the institutional basis sets the theoretical basis for the 
political environment as a constituent as well as for corporate resources and capabilities (e.g. Hillman 
et al., 2009; North, 1990; Rajwani et al., 2013).  
 Various papers describe institutional characteristics to be important to influence CPA. 
However, the majority of research focused on quantifiable aspects (e.g. formal rules), whereas 
unquantifiable characteristics were neglected (e.g. culture, history) (Rajwani et al., 2013). Looking at 
characteristics, institutions are claimed to be incomplete if they experience changing market 
conditions through technological change (North, 1990) and do not have applicable rules. As a result, 
firms transacting in this institutional environment experience transaction costs (Barzel, 1997; Foss, 
2003) because ‘...the actors have an imperfect understanding of the issues affecting them’ (North, 
1990, p. 357). Besides, uncertainty in the institutional environment arises because ‘politics is 
notoriously fickle. Momentum can shift rapidly and unexpectedly’ (Hart, 2004, p. 55). 
 Additionally, studies have superficially explored the specific interaction between firms and 
institutions yet. This may be due various influences from the institutional setting (Jackson & Deeg, 
2008) or the degree to which institutional settings are pronounced country wise. That is, emerging 
economies tend to have emerging formal institutions whereas complex institutions exist in developed 
countries (Rajwani et al., 2013). Particularly, a large part of CPA studies refers to the US context. 
Research on US institutions profits from long-term data availability on corporate political spending 
as well as from a competitive corporate political area due to the fragmented US political system 
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(Werner & Wilson, 2010). But, research on emerging economies is increasing and the relation 
between firms and emerging institutions is further explored (e.g. Khanna & Palepu, 2000).  
 Furthermore, the different institutional settings in countries not only determine the number of 
studies on a country, but influence the forms of CPA as well. CPA can be adapted to the political 
system, political landscape or interest groups (e.g. Coen, 1997; Hillman, 2003; Hillman et al., 2004; 
Hillman & Keim, 1995; Hillman & Hitt, 1999) as well as globalization or international laws (Rajwani 
et al., 2013). Concluding, the focus of CPA research on institutions concentrates on the US as well as 
emerging markets in order to provide a better understanding of the institutional context together with 
firms´ CPA.  
2.2.2 Political environment constituent 
The interrelation between business and politics takes place in the political environment, which 
describes the mutual interaction between political systems and firms and shapes CPA (e.g. 
Blumentritt & Nigh, 2002; Bonardi et al., 2005; Frynas & Mellahi, 2003; Hillman et al., 1999; 
Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Rajwani et al. 2013; Shaffer, Quasney, & Grimm, 2000; Walker & Rea, 2014). 
A popular strategy in the political environment is the theory of attractiveness of the political market 
to explain the interaction between CPA and politics (Bonardi et al., 2005). The authors claim that it 
depends upon the attractiveness of the political market to what extend firms engage in CPA. 
 There is a common understanding in research that the political market shapes firm 
performance (e.g. Gorostidi & Zhao, 2017; Hadani et al., 2016; Henisz, 2000), particularly the level 
of political risk does (Milliken, 1987). Studies on political risk categorize countries based on their 
political setting. That is, the US or Germany are low risk countries, whereas developing countries 
with non-democratic systems are high risk countries and oftentimes included in studies on firm 
performance effects of CPA (e.g. Delios & Henisz, 2003; Kobrin, 1979). Furthermore, research finds 
that the certainty of a political environment influences corporate and political interaction. The degree 
of certainty (or uncertainty) in a political environment shapes CPA (e.g. Delios & Henisz, 2003), and 
is linked to political risk together with political processes or regulation (Rajwani et al., 2013). 
 In addition to political risk and uncertainty, CPA studies refer to industrial organization theory 
when it comes to factors which shape CPA. Hillman and Hitt (1999) explain that firms can either use 
the transactional or the relational approach. Whereas the former one assumes CPA to be implemented 
only after an issue arises, the latter one considers the concurrent development of CPA and nonmarket 
issue. That is, the transactional approach refers to a short-term exchange between different parties 
based on a specific event, whereas the relational approach refers to the development of a long-term 
relationship and exchange between firms and politics including various events.  
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 Besides, there is research suggesting a link between market developments and CPA. For 
example, it is claimed that increased diversification within a firm may increase corporate conflicts 
and costs of CPA (e.g. Blumentritt & Nigh, 2002; Shaffer & Hillman, 2000). Looking at the process 
of CPA, studies typically consider the level of CPA in business strategy to be linked with the market 
strategy (e.g. Baron, 1995; Meznar & Nigh, 1995). Bonardi et al. (2006) state that a firm's political 
environment may influence firm performance effects of CPA. In their sample of 190 private US 
electric utilities during 1980-1992, they found that rivalry among interest groups lead to negative 
effects of nonmarket strategies whereas rivalry among politicians lead to positive effects.  
 Concluding, the political area as a constituent of the institutional environment inherits 
characteristics that shape CPA and influence firm performance. 
2.2.3 Adaptive corporate resources and capabilities 
Studies from adaptive corporate resources and capabilities describe factors that shape firms´ 
application of resources and capabilities in the non-market environment (e.g. Bonardi, Holburn, & 
Bergh, 2006; Capron & Chatain, 2008; Dahan, 2005; Frynas, Mellahi, & Pigman, 2006; Hillman et 
al., 2009; Keim & Zeithaml, 1986; McWilliams, Van Fleet, & Cory, 2002; Oliver & Holzinger, 2008; 
Rajwani et al., 2013; Schuler, Rehbein, & Cramer, 2002). Scholars consider corporate resources to 
be applied in the nonmarket environment, for example by tying corporate relations with the ruling 
political elite (Bonardi et al., 2006; Capron & Chatain, 2008; Frynas et al., 2006; Hillman et al., 2004; 
Oliver & Holzinger, 2008), and examine how these increase corporate profits (McWilliams et al., 
2002).  Defining political resources and capabilities, a number of scholars refers to the goods 
exchanged in the political market (e.g. Hillman & Hitt, 1999) and Dahan (2005) suggests four 
categories. Firms can use relational resources (e.g. personal contacts), they can apply recreational 
capabilities (e.g. corporate events), they can exploit financial resources (e.g. campaign contributions), 
and they can capitalize on their legitimization (e.g. corporate expertise, stakeholder support or public 
image). These political resources can be either owned or controlled by the firm to influence public 
decision making. However, studies seem not to consider the combination of political resources yet 
(Rajwani et al., 2013). Applying these corporate resources and capabilities in specific political 
environments, firms will not only be affected differently by political decisions (Bonardi et al., 2005; 
Coen, 1997), but they might influence the public policy process according to Oliver and Holzinger 
(2008). They claim that firms can manage the political environment by linking corporate capabilities 
with political strategies by hiring government experts, lobbying, and active advocacy. There are 
studies how firms implement their political resources and, for example, Dorobantu et al. (2016) 
suggest that they do so either collaboratively or independently to create and sustain value. 
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 Across different contexts and industries, e.g. oil and gas, firms may establish superior 
resources and capabilities (e.g. Bonardi et al., 2006; Frynas et al., 2006). Literature categorizes 
different contexts according to the level of corporate anticipation of events in their environment 
(Rajwani et al., 2013). A high level of anticipation is attributed to the endogenous context (Frynas et 
al., 2006), where firms react to foreseeable policy decisions, by effectively using their political 
resources (Capron & Chatain, 2008). In contrast, a low level of anticipation is attributed to the 
exogenous context, where firms adapt their political resources to novel events to sustain competitive 
advantage (Lawton & Rajwani, 2011; Oliver & Holzinger, 2008). Mellahi et al. (2016) complement 
this approach and claim that firms either adapt to (e.g. employ corporate resources and capabilities) 
or protect themselves from (e.g. lobbying, relational ties) the external environment (e.g. political 
market) which is what they call bridging and buffering strategies.  
 From a theory´s perspective, there are various theories on political resources and capabilities. 
The agency theory, for example, examines how managers´ biased decision making influences the use 
of political resources, whereas the resource dependency theory claims dependency on government an 
important factor to influence CPA (e.g. Hart, 2004, Hillman et al., 2004; Hillman et al., 2009; Meznar 
& Nigh, 1995) which can be measured as the corporate share of exports (Martin, 1995; Schuler, 
1999). Bonardi et al. (2005) claim a positive relation between institutional dependency and the 
likelihood to engage in political activity (Birnbaum, 1985). Moreover, the industrial organization 
theory explains the incorporation of political resources into the corporate strategy (Dahan, 2005) and 
the resource based view, finally, considers how valuable resources are developed (Mellahi et al., 
2016). The resource based view is incorporated in many CPA studies (e.g. McWilliams et al., 2002) 
and provides the basis for organizational capabilities in the nonmarket environment to explain 
competitive advantages (e.g. Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). 
 Concluding, research inherits the predominant idea that corporate political resources and 
capabilities are adapted in different political contexts to manage the interaction with the political 
environment and generate competitive advantages. The following sections examines whether CPA is 
able to translate competitive advantages into positive firm performance effects.  
2.3 Firm performance effects 
This part is grounded on adaptive corporate political resources and capabilities, their application in 
the political market and the link between competitive advantages and firm performance. Research 
assumes that firms integrate political resources into their political strategy to gain corporate 
advantages and influence the public policy process (e.g. Dahan, 2005) in order to get favorable policy 
changes, e.g. rate increases (Bonardi et al. 2006), or new import tariffs (Schuler, 1996) to affect firm 
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performance directly or indirectly (Lux et al., 2011). Political strategy formulation comprises a 
sequential decision on how to engage in CPA (Dahan, 2005; Hillman & Hitt, 1999). Hillman and 
Hitt´s (1999) influential approach categorizes the decision making process into the approach 
(transactional/ relational), the participation level (individual/ collective) and types of strategies. These 
types of strategies (information, financial incentive, constituency building) refer to the resources 
exchanged and include actions such as lobbying, contributions or grassroots mobilization of 
employees or suppliers. 
 However, CPA research is increasingly divided about firm performance, reporting 
inconclusive results. Looking at the most popular forms of CPA, i.e. campaign contribution and 
lobbying (Kaiser, 2009), research claims positive, negative as well as inconclusive firm performance 
effects simultaneously. Considering the divided view on firm performance effects in CPA research, 
the following section introduces literature on research design and different performance effects of 
CPA. 
2.3.1 Research design 
Research on nonmarket strategies, particularly CPA, and firm performance has increased since 2010, 
supported by improved statistical methods and data availability (Mellahi et al., 2016). The majority 
of research has commonly used accounting-based measures to determine firm performance effects of 
CPA, e.g. corporate profits, as well as considered a short time period, neglecting long-term effects of 
CPA (Lux et al., 2011). The majority of studies includes monetary CPA (e.g. PAC contributions and 
lobbying expenditures) compared to a minority that considers non-monetary measures of CPA as well 
(e.g. office space in Washington, D.C.) (Lux et al., 2011). This peculiarity is driven by public 
available data since 1974 for contributions and lobbying expenditures in the US (Lux et al., 2011).  
 The most important drivers for firms to engage in CPA, i.e. explanatory variables, are 
described by two research streams. One the one hand, management scholars refer to firm size and the 
institutional environment to explain CPA (e.g. Hillman et al., 2004). On the other hand, government 
regulation and political incumbency is claimed to be the decisive force by economic and political 
science (e.g. Grier & Munger, 1993). However, research across different fields has recognized that 
these antecedents of CPA may be more interrelated than expected and need more investigation (Lux 
et al., 2011). An increasing number of studies includes further links between nonmarket strategies 
and firm performance, e.g. relationship with stakeholders (Hillman & Keim, 2001) and consumer 
perception (Luo & Bhattacharya, 2006), to better explain the relationship between business and 
politics. 
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2.3.2 Positive effects 
Beginning with the positive effects of CPA, a considerable number of academic papers in nonmarket 
strategy research used to support this idea by examining monetary as well as non-monetary forms of 
CPA. For the former one, Shaffer et al. (2000) report a positive link between media reports of firms´ 
lobbying activities and firms´ net income. Moreover, de Figueiredo and Silverman (2006) find that 
universities receive more financial support from political committees, located in the same state, if 
they engage in lobbying. For the latter one, studies report positive firm performance effects as well. 
Hillman et al.´s (1999) early study finds positive abnormal returns for top managers appointed to 
federal office. Hillman (2005) supports the positive firm performance effects of political ties and 
claims that politicians on the board of directors are associated with better market-based performance 
particularly for regulated industries.  
 Looking at a broader angle, Lux et al. (2011) find a dominant opinion of positive firm 
performance effects of CPA in studies from 1976 to 2010. They selected 78 studies which reported a 
relation between antecedents/ CPA and/ or performance effects/ CPA, including monetary as well as 
non-monetary forms of CPA. What they find is that the majority of research found positive firm 
performance effects for monetary forms of CPA, neglecting non-monetary CPA.  
2.3.3 Negative effects 
Continuing with negative firm performance effects of CPA, an increasing number of studies questions 
positive effects of CPA by analyzing monetary as well as non-monetary forms of CPA. In comparison 
to distinct positive effects of lobbying, two studies found negative firm performance effects. On the 
one hand, Coates (2010) analyzed lobbying expenditures to be negatively related to firm value for 
S&P500 firms between 1998 and 2004. On the other hand, Igan et al. (2012) examined that financial 
institutions engaged in lobbying experienced strong negative abnormal returns during the financial 
crisis 2007/ 2008. Recently, Aggarwal et al. (2012) confirm negative firm performance effects. They 
examined corporate donations for political candidates between 1991 and 2004 in the US and found a 
negative correlation between donations and firm-level excess returns.  
 Hadani and Schuler (2013) support negative firm performance effects for various forms of 
monetary CPA in their study of political investments for 943 S&P 500 firms between 1998 and 2008. 
They find negative firm performance effects for CPA, including lobbying, campaign contributions, 
as well as corporate board service of former government employees.  
2.3.4 Inconclusive effects 
Concluding with inconclusive firm performance effects of CPA, some studies claim neither positive 
nor negative but insignificant results for campaign contributions as well as corporate lobbying (e.g. 
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Hersch, Netter, & Pope, 2008; Lenway, Jacobsen, & Goldstein, 1990; Lenway & Schuler, 1991). 
Hadani et al. (2016) just recently supported this claim by reviewing the performance effects of 93 
papers and claiming that the direct relation between CPA and firm level outcomes is only weak. 
 Even more important, they revisit Lux et al.´s (2011) findings of positive firm performance 
effect of CPA in their review of papers from 1976 to 2010 and claim insignificant performance effects 
for Lux et al.´s sample. They attribute the discrepancy to Lux et al.´s findings to a possible 
overestimation of positive effects by considering each reported sample as an independent observation. 
Furthermore, they weighted the effect sizes based on the sample size to adjust the measured effects.  
 
Concluding, even though many studies exist around firm performance effects of CPA, there is no 
consensus among research on how CPA shapes firm performance, providing future areas of research.  
2.3.5 Issues 
Inconclusive firm performance effects might be attributed to various factors that need more 
investigation. Firstly, CPA benefits from strong secondary data availability but has difficulty to gather 
primary data because response rates might be low. However, Lux et al. (2011) encourage research to 
use field study methods such as interviews or surveys. Secondly, the majority of research included 
monetary forms of CPA to measure performance, neglecting non-monetary forms of CPA aside 
effects (Lux et al., 2011). Thirdly, favorable public policy outcomes are not only shaped by CPA 
(Keim, 2001; Schuler, 2002), but by other influencing factors that need to be considered such as 
political party, media and national aspects (Keim, 2001). The latter one challenges the impact of CPA 
on firm performance (Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2004). Fourthly, most research includes only short 
time period of CPA in t0 and performance effects in t1, neglecting long-term effects (Lux et al., 2011).  
2.4 Link to presidential councils and outlook  
Considering inconsistent research findings as well as recent developments in the US, presidential 
councils set the opportunity to analyze firm performance effects of non-monetary CPA.  
 Firstly, research on CPA increased, however, the consensus about firm performance effects 
of CPA did not. Looking at two popular forms of CPA, i.e. contribution and lobbying, research claims 
positive, negative as well as inconclusive firm performance effects simultaneously, providing the 
need for further investigation. 
 Secondly, economic and legislative developments support the importance of CPA. Centrally 
planned economies have been decreasing whereas market economies increased globally, representing 
attractive political markets which seem to address ‘the need for greater comparative understandings 
of firms and governments in a range of institutional contexts’ (Rajwani et al., 2013, p. 3). Additionally, 
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expenditures on CPA increased in the US. Lobbying expenditures rose from USD 1.57 billion in 2000 
to USD 2.43 billion in 2017 (Center for Responsive Politics, 2017). These developments are 
underpinned by favorable US legislative development (i.e. Citizens United vs. Federal Election 
Commission). 
 Thirdly, the political development supports CPA as well. Two presidential councils were 
introduced by President Trump and provided council members with the opportunity to access the 
political market and establish ties with the new administration.  
 Concluding, inconclusive performance effects as well as recent developments in the US 
presidential councils set the opportunity to analyze firm performance effects of presidential councils. 
This master thesis aims to analyze the events around presidential councils (i.e. public statements, 
renunciations, dismissal) based on a market wide event study to determine firm performance effects. 
The following section contains the development of presidential councils, Hypotheses motivation, the 
event study´s methodology, and results.  
3. Investor reactions to changes in presidential councils  
3.1 Development of President Trump´s councils 
President Donald Trump established the Manufacturing Council and the Strategy and Policy Forum 
at the beginning of 2017, comprising of 47 members, to integrate corporate advice in policy making 
(see Table 1). CEOs largely appreciated their appointments to the councils, claiming their 
membership a ‘privileged opportunity to be in the room.’ (Robert Iger, Walt Disney). The following 
section describes the development of presidential councils from initiation until dismissal and 
contributing factors.  
 For the first time in US council history, three firms announced their disapproval with the 
administration´s decisions and renounced from the councils in January and June (i.e. Uber, Tesla, 
Walt Disney) due to several reasons. In the case of Uber, they were claimed to approve the Muslim 
Travel Ban and strong external pressures from customers followed (#deleteUber App campaign). 
Uber´s CEO explained that ‘… staying on the council was going to get in the way of that’ (Isaac, 
2017), referring to fair immigration rights. In the case of Tesla and Walt Disney, they renounced due 
to the President´s withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord in June, claiming that ‘climate change 
is real. Leaving Paris is not good for America or the world.’ (Musk, 2017). External pressure as well 
as negative publicity increased and complicated the situation for council members. The C.E.O.s 
experienced ‘continuing pressure from customers, employees, shareholders and board members to 
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take a position against what’s going on and separate themselves from president Trump’s councils’ 
(Gelles, 2017).  
 Demonstrations in Charlottesville marked a turning point and initiated a wave of 
renunciations. Firms complied with stakeholders´ pressure and renounced from the councils after the 
Charlottesville demonstrations when a women was killed and President Trump did not take sides. 
The first to renounce was Kenneth Frazier (Merck) who explained that ‘America’s leaders must honor 
our fundamental values by clearly rejecting expressions of hatred, bigotry and group supremacy, 
which run counter to the American ideal that all people are created equal’ (Rushe, 2017). Merck´s 
renunciation triggered different reactions, reflecting the controversial situation. On the one hand, 
there were council members who supported Frazier´s decision and renounced from the councils (e.g. 
Under Armour, Intel, AFL-CIO). On the other hand, President Trump claimed the firm to be ‘a leader 
in higher & higher drug prices while at the same time taking jobs out of the U.S. Bring jobs back & 
LOWER PRICES!’ (Trump, Twitter, 2017).  
 Nevertheless, the public continued to consider CEOs not to take their responsibility as industry 
leaders to comment on President Trump´s statements on Charlottesville. For example, Tom Glocer 
(former CEO of Thomson Reuters) impelled to follow Merck´s example, when he ‘… call[s] on all 
other members of Trump’s image-burnishing committees to do the same.’ (glocer, 2017). However, 
some council members did not react because they ‘feel some reticence to speak out because they’re 
afraid of being attacked by the president by name’ (Gelles, NY Times, 2017). Furthermore, the 
councils´ effectiveness was increasingly questioned because they used to have ‘… a few meetings 
with a bunch of fanfare, but it was more symbolic than anything else’ (Gelles, NY Times, 2017). 
 Though, some days after Charlottesville, council members reacted. Members of the 
Manufacturing Council renounced and the Strategy and Policy Forum disbanded. On August 16, 
2017, they let President Trump know about their decision, however, the President preempted them 
and dismissed the councils in a tweet himself. The dimension of the development and dismissal of 
the presidential councils is illustrated by Professor Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, Yale School of Management, 
when he explains that ‘In American history, we’ve never had business leaders decline national service 
when requested by the president… They’ve now turned their backs on him.’ (Gelles, NY Times, 
2017).  
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Table 1: Overview of presidential councils 
 








Extract of corporate statements




After careful consideration, I believe the initiative is no longer an 
effective vehicle ...
2 AFL-CIO Richard Trumka, President- x 15.08.17
The AFL-CIO has unequivocally denounced the actions of bigoted 
domestic terrorists in Charlottesville
3
Alliance for American 
Manufacturing
Scott Paul, President - 15.08.17
I'm resigning from the Manufacturing Jobs Initiative because it's 
the right thing for me to do.
4 Campbell Soup
Doug Oberhelman, former 
CEO
Food Products x 16.08.17
I believe the President should have been – and still needs to be – 
unambiguous on that point. 
5 Corning Inc. Wendell Weeks, CEO Electronic Equipment x 16.08.17
Over the last few days I have been saddened and angered over 
events taking place 
6 General Electric Jeff Immelt, Chairman
Industrial 
Conglomerates
x x 16.08.17 The President’s statements yesterday were deeply troubling. 




I resigned to call attention to the serious harm our divided political 
climate is causing to critical issues
8 Johnson & Johnson Alex Gorsky, CEO Pharmaceuticals x 16.08.17
Johnson & Johnson has a responsibility to remain engaged as 
important policy decisions are made.
9 Merck & Co Inc. Kennetz Frazier, CEO Pharmaceuticals x x 14.08.17
I feel a responsibility to take a stand against intolerance and 
extremism.
10 Tesla motors Inc. Elon Musk, CEO Automobiles x x 01.06.17
Am departing presidential councils. Climate change is real. Leaving 
Paris is not good for America 
11 Under Armour Inc. Kevin Plank, CEO
Textiles, Apparel & 
Luxury Goods
x x 14.08.17
I am appreciative of the opportunity to have served, but have 
decided to step down from the council. 
12 United Technologies Corp.Greg Hayes, CEO Aerospace & Defense x 16.08.17
It is clear that we need to collectively stand together and 
denounce the politics of hate
13 Arconic Klaus Kleinfeld - x - - -
14 Caterpillar Inc. Doug Oberhelman Capital Goods x - - -
15 Ford Motor Company Mark Fields
Automobile and 
Components
x - - -
16 U.S. Steel Mario Longhi - x - - -
17 Boeing Co. Dennis Muilenburg, CEOAerospace & Defense x x 16.08.17 Muilenburg is staying with the council, the company said.
18 Dana Inc. Jim Kamsickas, CEO Auto Components x 16.08.17 -
19 Dell Technologies Inc. Michael Dell, CEO Software x 16.08.17 18.08.17
There's no change in Dell engaging with the Trump administration 
and governments around the world 
20 Dow Chemical Andrew Liveris, CEO Chemicals x 16.08.17 14.08.17 I condemn the violence this weekend in Charlottesville, Virginia, 




22 Hoover Institute Kevin Warsh - 16.08.17 -
23 International Paper Co. Mark Sutton, CEO Containers & Packaging x 16.08.17 16.08.17
International Paper strongly condemns the violence that took 
place in Charlottesville over the weekend 
24 Lockheed Martin Corp. Marillyn Hewson, CEO Aerospace & Defense x 16.08.17 -
25 Newell Brands Inc. Michael Polk, CEO Household Durables x 16.08.17 15.08.17
We find the events of this past weekend in Charlottesville to be 
incredibly troubling. 
26 Nucor Corp. John Ferriola, CEO Metals & Mining x 16.08.17 14.08.17
At Nucor, we condemn the violence that occurred this past 
weekend in Charlottesville 
27 Timken Company Rich Kyle, CEO Machinery x 16.08.17 -
28 Whirlpool Corp. Jeff Fettig, CEO Household Durables x 16.08.17 14.08.17
The company will continue on the Manufacturing Jobs Initiative to 
represent our industry, 
1 Walt Disney Co. Bob Iger, CEO Media x 01.06.17
As a matter of principle, I've resigned from the President's Council 
over the #ParisAgreement 
2 Uber
Travis Kalanick, former 
CEO
- 02.02.17
We will fight for the rights of immigrants in our communities so 
that each of us can be who we are 
3 BCG Rich Lesser, CEO - 16.08.17 -
4 IHS Markit
Daniel Yergin, Vice 
Chairman
Professional Service x 16.08.17 -
5 General Motors Co. Mary Barra, CEO Automobiles x 16.08.17 16.08.17
The President and members of the President’s Strategic and Policy 
Forum have disbanded the forum. 
6 IBM Ginni Rometty, CEO IT Services x 16.08.17 16.08.17
But this group can no longer serve the purpose for which it was 
formed. 
7 Cleveland Clinic Tobi Cosgrove, CEO - 16.08.16
There will be no change to Cosgrove's role, the Cleveland Clinic 
told the Cleveland Plain-Dealer.
8 PepsiCo Inc. Indra Nooyi, CEO Beverages x 16.08.17 12.08.17
Heartbroken by the violence in #Charlottesville. Hate and 
intolerance are a betrayal of what we stand 




Adebayo Ogunlesi, CEO- 16.08.17 -
11 JPMorgan Chase & Co Jamie Dimon, CEO Banks x 16.08.17 14.08.17
We were all disturbed by the bigotry and violence in 
Charlottesville, Virginia this past weekend 
12 Wal mart Stores Inc. Dough McMillon, CEO Food & Staples Retailing x 16.08.17 14.08.17
We believe we should stay engaged to try to influence decisions in 
a positive way
13 Patomak Global PartnersPaul Atkins, CEO - 16.08.17 -
14 BlackRock Inc. Larry Fink, CEO Capital Markets x 16.08.17 -
15 Blackstone Group LP Stephen Schwarzman, CEOCapital Markets x 16.08.16 14.08.17
I am deeply saddened and troubled by the tragic events in 
Charlottesville. 
Firms marked with "-" are excluded because CEOs resigned from their corporate position
American Manufacturing Council
Strategy and Policy Forum
Former CEOs
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3.2 Development of hypotheses 
In order to explain different firm performance effects of changes in the composition of presidential 
councils, the motivation of four Hypotheses will be introduced below. For Hypothesis 1, the average 
investor reaction to all events of presidential councils is assumed to be negative. For Hypotheses 2, 
and 3, investor reactions to are assumed to be positive (i.e. renunciation from the council, public 
statements), whereas for Hypothesis 4 investor reactions are assumed to be negative (i.e. remaining 
in the council until dismissal).  
3.2.1 Negative reactions  
This section explains that negative investor reactions are expected to changes in presidential councils 
due to an unstable US context as well as little corporate control over political resources. The changes 
in presidential councils include renunciations, public statements, and the dismissal, and average 
investor reactions to these events are measured.  
 From a theoretical perspective, some research finds that CPA generates positive firm 
performance effects, and presidential councils are a new form of political resources (Dahan, 2005). 
Additional political resources may increase the attractiveness of the political market and positive firm 
performance effects (Bonardi et al., 2005; Werner, 2017).  
 However, the current US context as well as diminished control over corporate political 
resources may hamper positive firm performance effects. Firstly, uncertainty in US politics arose due 
to unexpected political decisions of President Trump´s administration and due to the shift in US world 
politics (e.g. withdrawal from Paris Climate Accord). Besides, enhanced income inequality in the US 
increased public interest on corporate political engagement (Walker & Rea, 2014) as well as social 
concerns (Hiatt & Park, 2013), resulting in negative sentiment on CPA (Smith, 2000) and negative 
brand awareness for firms that make contributions to outside political spending groups (Torres-
Spelliscy, 2016).  
 Secondly, it seems that council members´ control over political resources and political 
influence decreased (Dahan, 2005) as a result of decreased stakeholder support, public image and 
political reputation which was shown in three cases. First, the customer-initiated campaign 
#deleteUber accused Uber of supporting President Trump´s ‘Muslim Travel Ban’ and made the firm 
lose a lot of customers. Second, public image of council members was hampered when those were 
urged to react because ‘executives cannot live with customers thinking they are in cahoots with 
someone [President Trump] who supports white supremacists or neo-Nazis.’ according to Bill 
George, a board member of Goldman Sachs (Gelles, NY Times, 2017). Third, corporate political 
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reputation decreased as happened with Merck, when President Trump publically questioned the firm´s 
operating business after its CEO renounced from the Manufacturing Council.  
Concluding, the uncertainty in US politics, the negative sentiment on CPA as well as lost 
corporate political resources lead to Hypothesis 1:  
Hypothesis 1: Negative investor reactions to changes in the composition of presidential 
councils. 
3.2.2 Positive reactions to renunciations 
Hypotheses 2-4 refer to investor reactions to a specific event in presidential councils and include 
subsamples of council members to detail investor reactions. The first subsample to be examined 
consists of eleven firms that renounced from the councils prior to the dismissals. For this case, positive 
investor reactions are assumed because renunciations may signalize corporate commitment to the 
claims of the society in which firms operate.  
 In theory, renunciations can be considered reallocations of corporate political resources and 
capabilities due to adjusted profit expectations (Bonardi et al., 2005; Coen, 1997). That is, exogenous 
shocks (i.e. withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord) may have hampered corporate competitive 
advantages (Lawton & Rajwani, 2011; Oliver & Holzinger, 2008). Therefore, firms may experience 
diminished corporate success so that they adapt their profit expectations and reallocate their political 
resource (i.e. renunciation from council).  
 Following, I consider three attributes important in explaining positive investor reactions to 
renunciations. Firstly, council members were able to evade increasing stakeholder pressure by 
renouncing. In August 2017, the situation of council members was characterized by strong ‘… 
customer issues for those [companies] where some of the CEOs felt they were under pressure’ 
according to Stephen Schwarzman, chairman of the Strategy and Policy Forum (Landy, 2017). Even 
more direct voices urged member firms ‘to stop, and desert, and leave this administration isolated’ 
(Kaplan, 2017). Research supports customers´ ability to exert pressure, claiming that they have the 
ability to determine the global impression of the firm based on their collective perception (Rindova, 
Williamson, Petkova, & Sever, 2005). However, by renouncing, council members complied with 
external pressure to end their council membership. 
 Secondly, renouncing firms may signal uncertainty avoidance to the markets. In fact, the 
prevailing business mood in the US is characterized by ‘…extreme uncertainty introduced into the 
market by the new Administration’ (ACEC, 2016). The nervous sentiment of the markets was 
reinforced by changes in the government (Gorostidi & Zhao, 2017) and the political regime (Sun, 
Mellahi, &, Wright, 2012), when Donald Trump was elected US president and when the US withdrew 
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from Paris Climate Accord. Renouncing from presidential councils, council members ended their 
direct communication channel to the political administration and a reliable source of information 
regarding future political steps of the administration. However, simultaneously, renouncing firms 
signaled uncertainty avoidance to both markets and customers because they retract from direct 
dependency on the administration, comply with customer pressure and make a first step to restore 
control over their public image.  
 Thirdly, renouncing firms may decrease the costs of possible intervention from government. 
Investors may consider renunciations a monetary means to decrease corporate costs arising from 
governmental interventions. Okhmatovskiy (2010) claims that political ties with government officials 
can raise corporate costs (Gorostidi & Zhao, 2017). Boeing, for example, suffered from increased 
corporate costs due to its corporate ties with the administration. That is, the council member´s share 
price dropped distinctively following President Trump´s tweet to cancel the order of the President´s 
Air Force One: ‘Boeing is building a brand new 747 Air Force One for future presidents, but costs 
are out of control, more than $4 billion. Cancel order!’ (Trump, Twitter, 2016). Renouncing from the 
councils, firms applied an instrument in order to evade possible interventions from government and 
corporate costs of these. 
 Concluding, the combination of evaded stakeholder pressure, uncertainty avoidance, and 
reduced costs of government intervention suggest that renunciations from presidential councils lead 
to positive investor reactions towards renunciations in Hypothesis 2: 
Hypothesis 2: Firms renouncing from presidential councils will experience positive 
investor reactions. 
3.2.3 Positive reactions to public statements 
The second subsample to be examined consists of twelve firms that remained in the councils until 
dismissal while submitting public statements about their corporate and their continuance in the 
council. In this case, I assume positive investor reactions because of firms´ improved public image, 
reduced information asymmetries, and retained corporate political ties.  
 Firstly, firms may use public statements to improve their public image. Council members were 
involved in controversial discussions over presidential councils and the President´s administration. 
This may have hampered the members´ public image, as a political resource, as well as their political 
strategy (Dahan, 2005). Using public statements, firms may have improved their public positioning 
by declaring corporate values and beliefs, e.g. ecological engagement. For the sports industry, 
Kellison and Mondello, (2012) showed that corporate pro-environmental behavior improves 
corporate public image, illustrating the positive effects of corporate statements. Another example is 
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Jeff Immelt´s statement, CEO of GE and member of the Manufacturing Council, when he assured to 
continuously fight climate change, even though he was ‘disappointed with today’s decision on the 
Paris Agreement. Climate change is real. Industry must now lead and not depend on government.’ 
(Immelt, 2017). 
 Secondly, public statements may be an instrument to reduce information asymmetries between 
managers and investors. Aligning corporate strategic goals with CPA, investors value public 
statements as a means ‘to gain insight into management’s better informed perceptions... [which] 
should, in principle, reduce the information asymmetry that investors face’ (Schijven & Hitt, 2012, p. 
1248). Firms´ public commitment to corporate goals has been proven to be of importance, particularly 
after the Charlottesville demonstrations in August 2017. which increased information asymmetries, 
because ‘…the events of the last few days have transformed the council’s laudable mission of job 
creation into a perception of political support for the Administration and its statements.’ (Ramsey, 
2017). Submitting public statements, council members may have increased investors´ certainty over 
corporate goals and by doing so, decreased information asymmetries.  
 Thirdly, public instruments may be a means to retain direct corporate links to the ruling elite, 
resulting in positive investor reactions. Council members appreciate their membership and claim it a 
‘privileged opportunity to have a voice in the room.’ (Barnes, 2017). The value of political ties is 
supported by Hillman et al. (1999), claiming that firms receive positive abnormal returns if they 
manage to establish political ties via appointments of their managers into federal office.  
 Concluding, the combination of improved brand image, reduced information asymmetries and 
retention of political ties lead to positive investor reactions towards corporate public statements in 
Hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 3: Firms submitting a public statement and remaining in the councils will 
experience positive investor reaction.  
3.2.4 Negative reactions to remaining firms 
The third subsample to be investigated are nineteen firms that remained in the councils until dismissal, 
while not submitting a public statement despite public controversy. We know from Hypothesis 3 that 
firms submitting a statement may improve their political reputation. However, negative investor 
reactions are assumed towards remaining firms because they may suffer from brand damage, negative 
public sentiment, and decreased firm reputation. Before describing the reasons for negative investor 
reactions I explain why firms remained in councils.  
 Retaining their political ties, firms tried to avoid a negative public breach with President 
Trump as seen with Merck´s renunciation from the Manufacturing Council. Gorostidi and Zhao 
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(2017) explain this occurrence in the sense that firms try to ‘hold and protect a special position that 
guarantees access to a future strategic step, which seals its right to participate in a more influential 
manner’ (p. 381). By doing so, firms attempt to maintain their reputation with political actors, exercise 
control over their political reputation and use it as a political resource within their political strategy 
to influence public policy (Dahan, 2005). Also, firms´ sympathetic ideology and republican party 
affiliation may have encouraged firms to remain and support President Trump (Burris, 2001; Lux et 
al., 2011). Despite firms´ attempt to retain political ties and strengthen their political reputation, I 
assume negative investor reactions due to the brand damage and negative public sentiment.  
Firstly, explaining the difficult situation for council members, experts claimed that ‘within 
companies, there’s a high level of alert on the public outrage. The cost to corporate brands rises each 
day that they continue to align themselves with Trump.’ (Levine, 2017). This rising negative public 
tendency is particularly harmful for council members not submitting a public statement in the light 
of the positive influence which organizational reputation has on organizational performance (Rindova 
et al., 2005).  
 Secondly, there is negative public sentiment on firms related to President Trump. The research 
firm MavenMagnet analyzed 6,421 digital conversations between November 2016 and April 2017 to 
determine consumer perception of corporate relations with President Trump. They find that firms, 
somehow connected to President Trump, have been associated with negative digital conversations in 
channels (e.g. social media). This finding gives rise to the assumption that council members´ 
reputation might be particularly hampered, because it is ‘consisting of subjective perceptions held by 
a particular audience with respect to the likelihood of seeing desired behaviors and outputs from the 
firm in the future’ (Lange, Lee, & Dai, 2011, p. 158).  
 Concluding, firms remaining in the presidential councils might experience negative public 
awareness due to their political ties with President Trump and witness brand damage, negative public 
sentiment, and decreased firm reputation, leading to negative investor reactions towards remaining 
firms in Hypothesis 4: 
Hypothesis 4: Firms remaining in presidential councils will experience negative investor 
reactions. 
3.3 Event study analysis 
3.3.1 Research design assumptions 
The following section introduces the market event study analysis to examine firm performance effects 
of presidential councils. The events related to presidential councils (i.e. renunciations, public 
statements, dismissals) provide the basis for this master thesis in order to analyze how investors 
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reacted to the changes in the composition of presidential councils. Before estimating the market-wide 
event study, I checked whether critical assumptions of an event study hold in this context.  
 Firstly, events must not be foreseeable so that investors could not have predicted the events. 
In the case of renunciations and public statements, investors reacted to events that have been 
controlled by the CEOs of the council members. In the case of the dismissals, investors reacted to 
President Trump´s twitter statement, announcing the dismissal of the presidential councils. 
Concluding, the events on presidential councils are not foreseeable. 
Secondly, I examine confounding events during the event window. If other events than the 
dismissal, public statements or renunciations occurred, they might distort firm performance effects of 
presidential councils. Based on the definition of McWilliams and Siegel (1997), confounding events 
are comprised of dividend declaration, mergers and acquisitions (M&A), government contract, new 
products/services, suits, unexpected earnings, change in key executive. I found two M&A 
announcements for JPMorgan Chase on August 16 and for Blackstone Inc. on August 18 derived 
from Reuters Eikon. However, both events are not considered significantly, as the former includes an 
advisory position with rather low fees and the latter deal is of too small volume to significantly 
influence the large PE firms. Therefore, I assume no confounding events.  
Thirdly, I apply a short event window due to unanticipated events and efficient markets. 
Efficient markets assume that existing information is displayed in the stock price and new information 
is immediately included. The information about the events is most likely to be immediately 
incorporated into the stock price which is in line with the kind of events: President Trump dismissed 
the two councils in an instant via a tweet so that every relevant information was revealed immediately. 
This is supported by the fact that the media awareness of President Trump and council members has 
been already high due to several public statements and renunciations from council members before 
the dismissal happened. Thus, the released information regarding the dismissals might be even faster 
incorporated in the stock price, so that I base the market-wide event study on the following estimation 
and event window: [-408, -10], [-1, 1].  
Before estimating the market model and calculating abnormal returns, I exclude all firms that 
are not publicly listed. By doing so, I only incorporate listed firms so that the sample is reduced by 
10 firms to 40 firms overall. Additionally, four firms are excluded from the sample because their 
CEOs retired from their corporate position. Lastly, six firms that have memberships in both councils 




As all critical assumptions of an event study hold, I am able to leverage the changes in presidential 
councils via an event study to assess investors’ reactions to these events.  
First, I apply the market model to estimate the correlation between a single firm´s stock return 
and the market return. By doing so, I include two types of data into the market model: council 
members´ returns (Firm returnit) and S&P500 firms´ returns (Market returnt), both derived from 
Yahoo Finance. The estimation window ranges from January 2016 until August 2017 [-408, -10], and 
the event window is [-1,1]. I estimated the following regression: 
Firm returnit = ai + bi Market returnt + et        (1) 
Second, I use equation (1) to calculate each firm´s abnormal return (AR). That is, I deduct the 
predicted marekt return derived from equation (1) from the firm return measuring the abnormal firm 
return for every trading day.  
Abnormal firm returnit = Firm returnit - (ai + bi Market returnt)     (2) 
Third, I use equation (2) to calculate each firm´s cumulative abnormal return (CAR). That is, 
I sum each firm´s abnormal return for a chosen event window retrieving the cumulative abnormal 
return for each firm which will be applied for Hypotheses 2-4. 
Cumulative abnormal firm returni =  Abnormal firm returnit     (3) 
Fourth, I average equation (3) to calculate each firm´s average cumulative abnormal return 
(CAAR) to compare average returns of different events in changes in the composition of presidential 
councils (i.e. dismissal) which will be applied for Hypothesis 1.  
Cumulative average abnormal firm returni = 1/N  Abnormal firm returnit   (4) 
 Concluding, based on the event study, I examine investor reactions to changes in the 
composition of presidential councils in Hypotheses 1-4.  
3.3.3 Results 
After conducting the market wide event study, the results are presented in Table 2 - 4 and provide no 
support for the claims of Hypotheses 1-4. Thus, the assumption of significant investor reactions to 
changes in the composition of presidential councils cannot be supported. As a consequence, 
conclusions drawn from this master thesis´s results cannot be generalized. Instead, the results should 
be considered in the context of novel events of presidential councils, they should be retested based 
on a larger sample, and they should be comprehensive in measuring the direct link between CPA and 
firm performance. In the following, the results as well as possible context specific explanations are 
presented. 
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Table 2: Average investor reactions to presidential councils 
 
 
Hypothesis 1: Negative investor reactions to changes in the composition of presidential councils. 
For Hypothesis 1, the results of the event study do not support negative investor reactions and 
correspond to insignificant firm performance findings of CPA of prior research (e.g. Hersch et al., 
2008; Lenway et al., 1990;). Looking at the results of the analysis (see Table 2), the negative signs of 
the CAARs of each event are in line with Hypothesis 1 and rather negative for eleven firms 
renouncing from the councils (-0.0051305) compared to the overall market development. However, 
the negative effect of changes in councils is not significant for any of the events, on average. 
According to the two tailed t-test at alpha = 5% (|t| > |1.96|), the CAARs are insignificant across any 
change in composition of presidential councils (see Table 3). Concluding, the results do not support 
the claim of negative firm performance to any of the changes in presidential councils. 
 
Table 3: CAARs across different subsamples 
 
 
Estimation Event Standard Significance
Window Window Events n CAAR deviation t-statistics 95%
All firms 30 -0,0022223 0,0171689 -0,7089478 NO
Renounce 11 -0,0051305 0,0151738 -1,121407 NO
Remain 19 -0,0021773 0,0192216 -0,4937526 NO
Statement 12 -0,0017761 0,0192384 -0,3198105 NO





















All firms Renounce Remain Statement
CAAR of different samples [-1,1] CAAR [-1,1]
Standard deviation
30 11 19 12
n Subsample size
t-statistic value (two-tailed test, |t| = |1.96|)t
-0,7089 -1,1214 -0,4938 -0,3198
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In the following, possible inferences for the non-results will be drawn, including prior research results 
of inconclusive effects of CPA and economic factors.  
 The non-effect of Hypothesis 1 corresponds with findings of prior research. Those include 
insignificant effects of campaign contributions or lobbying on firm performance (e.g. Hersch et al., 
2008; Lenway et al., 1990), and Hadani et al.´s (2016) finding that past research´s claim of positive 
firm performance effects is not as strong as expected. A potential reason behind the non-result is 
Dahan´s (2005) claim that firms are able to influence the political market if they are able to control 
political resources such as brand image or political reputation. In fact, the development of the councils 
was characterized by negative publicity on council membership as well pressure from stakeholders, 
impairing public image and questioning council members´ control over their political resources. 
 Another potential reason might be that council members from highly regulated industries 
experienced institutional dependency, consistent with resource dependency theory (e.g. Meznar & 
Nigh, 1995, Hart, 2004, Hillman et al., 2004; Hillman et al., 2009). As markets used to consider 
governments´ corporate influence when evaluating corporate performance as a means of stock price 
change, corporate relations with the government as well as corporate membership in presidential 
councils might be already incorporated in the stock price and may weaken a possible stock market 
reaction to the new information released.  
Besides, a further reason for the non-effect may be firms´ and investors´ lack of experience 
with President Trump´s interaction with the councils. The councils were established recently by 
President Trump, research on councils is little and the events around presidential councils were novel. 
Thus, investors relation towards the councils as well as President Trump´s interaction with the council 
members was developed over a short period of time as well as their assessment towards the events, 
possibly explaining insignificant investor reactions.  
Concluding, the analysis reveals a non-effect for changes in the composition of presidential 
councils which can be partly explained by prior research and encourages further research on 
presidential councils and firm performance effects.  
 
Hypotheses 2-4: subgroup analyses of Hypothesis 1 
The following section reports the results for Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 by calculating the CARs as the 
sum of the CAR of each observation in the subgroups (see Table 4) in the event window [-1, 1].  
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Table 4: Investor reactions to events in presidential councils 
 
 
Hypothesis 2: Firms renouncing from presidential councils will experience positive investor reaction. 
For Hypothesis 2, the results of the event study do not support positive investor reactions. Looking at 
the results of the analysis (see Table 4), the claim of Hypothesis 2 is not supported. The sign of the 
cumulative abnormal return is not positive as expected (-0.1693) and more importantly the CAR is 
not significant, according to the two tailed t-test at alpha = 5% |t| > |1.96|). This claim is supported by 
the range of the 95% confidence interval, including zero.  
 Following, I will state possible reasons for this non-effect, including public pressure, unsecure 
US context, different motives of renunciations, and disparity towards the political administration. 
Firstly, renunciations comport with Engau and Hoffman´s (2011) claim that firms may withdraw from 
uncertain political markets to avoid risk. In the case of renunciations, President Trump publicly 
commented on the renunciations, such as with Merck, when he wrote on Twitter that ‘for every CEO 
that drops out of the Manufacturing Council, I have many to take their place. Grandstanders should 
not have gone on. JOBS!’ (Trump, Twitter, 2017). Therefore, renunciations might not be the best 
option to avoid risk so that council members might want to search for further political strategies to 
circumvent uncertain political markets.  
Secondly, renunciations have been embedded within an unsecure US context. That is, the 
unstable current economic, civic and political development in the US may influence corporate 
business. Thus, the US´s changing future global position (e.g. protectionism) as well as allegations 
towards current administration´s bonds with Russian officials may be of more interest to stock 
markets than renunciations are.  
Thirdly, renunciations have been characterized by different motives, sending disparate signals. 
Looking at the first renunciations (e.g. Walt Disney, Tesla, Merck), they were a means to express 
disagreement with current politics (e.g. withdrawal from Paris Climate Accord), whereas later 
renunciations followed strong external pressure to leave the councils. Therefore, intrinsic corporate 
Estimation Event mean
Window Window Hypotheses n CAR CAR t-Statistics Std. Error Std. Dev.
H1: All firms 30  -0,0022*  -0,0022* -0,7089 - 0,0171 - -
H2: Renounce 11 -0,1693 -0,0154 -1,9423 0,0079 0,0263 -0,0330 0,0023
H3: Statement 19 -0,1241 -0,0065 -0,8552 0,0076 0,0333 -0,0226 0,0095
H4: Remain 12 -0,0639 -0,0074 -0,8520 0,0086 0,0299 -0,0264 0,0116





motivation may have been different according to the timing of the renunciation, so that council 
members might want to search for additional means to express their motives in public. 
Fourthly, the number of renunciations differed between the Manufacturing Council and the 
Strategy and Policy Forum. That is, twelve members of the Manufacturing Council renounced 
whereas two members of the Strategy and Policy Forum did. This might be due to the different level 
of dependency on the government, which might be more pronounced for Strategy and Policy Forum 
members due to their industry affiliation and degree of regulation. Renouncing from the councils, 
more firms of the Manufacturing council decided to stop their political engagement, possibly 
accounting for divergent strategic goals, the assessment of the current political development, and the 
potential influences of renunciations.  
Concluding, the analysis reveals a non-effect for renunciations which corresponds with 
insignificant results of prior CPA research, and encourages further research on renunciations. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Firms remaining in presidential councils until dismissal but submitting a public 
statement will experience positive investor reactions.  
For Hypothesis 3, the results of the event study do not support positive investor reactions. Looking at 
the results of the analysis (see Table 4), the claim of Hypothesis 3 is not supported. The sign of the 
cumulative abnormal return is not positive as expected (-0.0639) for twelve firms giving a public 
statement. Additionally, the CAR is not significant, according to the two tailed t-test at alpha = 5% |t| 
> |1.96|). This claim is supported by the range of the 95% confidence interval, including zero.  
 Following, I will explain possible reasons for this non-effect, including the prevalent 
controversy on councils and many corporate statements in media. Firstly, council members have 
experienced a public controversy around corporate council membership and were increasingly urged 
to renounce from the councils. Besides, council members attracted public attention due to customer 
movements (e.g. #deleteUber campaign) or they were put into public spotlight when they were 
mentioned in a tweet of President Trump (‘Now that Ken Frazier of Merck Pharma has resigned from 
President's Manufacturing Council,he will have more time to LOWER RIPOFF DRUG PRICES!’, 
(Trump, Twitter, 2017)). Considering the context of high media awareness of council members, 
corporate public statements might not be the most effective ones so that firms may want to find further 
strategic means in order to be heard in public.  
Secondly, the firm performance effects of public statements are different according to the date 
of the statement. This comports with Yoffie´s (1987) approach of political leader and followers, when 
he differentiates between the corporate political participation order in the political market. Looking 
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at the first public statement of PepsiCo´s CEO, Indra Nooyi, after Charlottesville demonstrations on 
August 14, the CAR for PepsiCo was 0.0248. However, looking at six following public statements, 
their average was -0.0254. The difference in the two rates shows that effect of the first public 
statement was positive whereas it was negative, on average, for the following statements. Thus, firms 
might want to consider the first mover advantages and political leaders according to Yoffie (1987) in 
their political strategy in order to achieve the desired results.  
Thirdly, President Trump used to give public statements via Twitter, introducing a new form 
of political expression to the public. By doing so, the President is able to declare his opinion on certain 
topics and reacts fast on political and economic developments. Thus, people not only witness political 
developments from newspapers or TV shows, but those are communicated via usual channels such 
as social media. Considering the context of presidential statements given on social media, council 
members might want to search for additional communication strategies than corporate public 
statements in order to reach the public.  
Concluding, the analysis reveals a non-effect for public statements, providing future research to 
study on firm performance effects of corporate public statements.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Firms remaining in presidential councils until dismissal will experience negative 
investor reactions. 
For Hypothesis 4, the results of the event study do not support negative investor reactions. Even 
though the sign of the cumulative abnormal return for nineteen firms remaining in presidential 
councils is negative as expected (-0.1241), the CAR is not significant, according to the two tailed t-
test at alpha = 5% (|t| > |1.96|). This claim is supported by the range of the 95% confidence interval, 
including zero.  
 Following, I will explain possible reasons for this non-effect, including CEOs representing 
the firms, further CPA channels of council members, different company valuation, and stock market 
performance in the US. Firstly, comporting with Hadani and Schuler´s (2013) findings, biased 
managerial decision making may influence a firm´s decision to engage in CPA. Thus, managers 
inherit a specific position in the decision making process of CPA and stand out from the firm. 
Therefore, it might be inferred that council membership might be rather attributed to managers as 
individuals than to the firms so that impacts of council membership are less attributable to the firms.  
 Secondly, most of the council members are engaged in long-term CPA which comports with 
Lux et al.´s (2011) findings, that larger firms are rather likely to be engaged in CPA. Considering the 
2016 lobbying expenditures of the council members (retrieved from opensecrets.org), 27 of 30 
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council members reported lobbying expenditures with a total volume of USD 129.694.330,00 and 
USD 4.631.940,36 $ per firm, on average. Referring to positive firm performance effects of lobbying 
according to Shaffer et al. (2000), council members´ lobbying activities might be more of a suitable 
instrument of CPA than presidential councils are. 
Thirdly, the US media landscape was determined by negative publicity towards presidential 
councils and the current political administration. However, looking at the S&P 500, the development 
from December 2016 until August 2017 was positive, according to Reuters Eikon. That is, the index 
increased from approx. 2.245 points in December 30, 2016 to approx. 2,470 points in August 16, 
2017. Considering the positive stock market development, it might be inferred that council members 
contributed to the positive development as well as benefitted from the positive market.  
 Concluding, the analysis reveals a non-effect for firms remaining in the council, providing 
future research with more opportunities to examine effects of council membership.  
 
In addition to context specific explanations for Hypotheses 1-4, the methods of this master thesis´s 
analysis as well as the results correspond to prior research. The results of Hypotheses 1-4 are in line 
with an existing body of research on insignificant results (e.g. Hersch et al., 2008; Lenway et al., 
1990; Lenway & Schuler, 1991; Hadani et al., 2016). Besides, stock price reaction was used as a 
market-based measure to determine firm performance effect of presidential council which is in line 
with most research on CPA (see Lux et al., 2011). There are non-performance measurements that 
could be applied to account for effect sizes, e.g. office space in Washington D.C., as happened with 
Lux et al. (2011), when significant effects were found. Furthermore, this master thesis explores the 
direct link between CPA and firm performance as happened in prior research (e.g. Lux et al., 2011; 
Mellahi et al., 2016). There are further explaining attributes (e.g. consumer relation, stakeholder 
perception, brand image) which can be considered to explain effects (Mellahi et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, the event window of [-1, 1] complies with the ones that were applied in prior research 
(Lux et al., 2011). Larger time frames might be appropriate to measure effects because firm 
performance effects might have an impact in further time periods.  
 As a consequence, the non-results of this master thesis comply with prior research´s findings 
of insignificant firm performance effects. Moreover, a general conclusion cannot be inferred from 
these results due to several shortcomings, e.g. the firms sampled, the event window applied or the 
measure of performance effects. Conclusions should be considered in the specific context of novel 
effects of presidential councils and provide future areas of research, which will be stated in the 
following section.  
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4. Discussion and conclusion 
4.1 Contribution 
This master thesis contributes theoretically and empirically to CPA literature.  
From a theoretical perspective, this master thesis extends the area of non-monetary CPA and 
corporate political resources (i.e. corporate council membership). Besides, it enhances the research 
field of presidential councils which appears to be less explored in current literature so far. This is due 
to the fact, that events on presidential councils have been available only sparsely. In addition, the 
findings of this master thesis complement with prior research on inconclusive firm performance 
effects of CPA, providing support for prior research´s findings of insignificant performance effects 
of CPA which may be related to the master thesis´s limitations that are further explained below.  
From an empirical perspective, this master thesis finds that the claim of investor reactions to 
events of presidential councils is not supported despite negative publicity and public pressure on 
member firms to take a stand in public on their political opinion. Additionally, the non-effects of 
Hypotheses 2-4 suggest that it cannot be supported that renunciations, public statements, and 
dismissals significantly influenced stock prices.  
4.2 Managerial implications 
Oler, Harrison, and Allen (2008) claim that managerial implications are limited in the sense that 
‘decision-makers should exercise caution when deciding how much weight to give to information 
regarding immediate market reactions’ (p.174). However, the following part suggests managerial 
implications under consideration of the small sample size, the novel events and the non-effects.  
Firstly, public disapproval and customer skepticism have been proven to arise quickly. The 
development of the presidential council has shown how customer movements are able to shape 
corporate reputation and brand image. Thus, companies might want to explore political strategies how 
to secure their public reputation and how to cope with negative public sentiment.  
Secondly, biased managerial decision making may influence a firm´s decision to engage in 
CPA (Hadani & Schuler, 2013). Thus, managers inherit a specific position in the decision making 
process of CPA and represent their firm within the presidential council, representing corporate values 
and beliefs. Thus, it might be inferred that council membership might be rather attributed to managers 
as individuals than to the firms so that consequences of council membership is less attributable to the 
firms. Considering the representative function of managers in public political functions, firm might 
want to consider their alignment with company representatives in their corporate political strategy. 
Thirdly, managers should be selective in how to invest their limited resources available. From 
a managerial perspective, managers have limited resources (e.g. attention, time) and from a market 
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performance perspective, presidential councils might not create value because the market does not 
react to any changes in the composition of presidential councils. Even though presidential councils 
grant political access they might not be the most influential mechanism to improve firm performance. 
Consequently, companies might want to explore further options how to access the political market 
and improve performance.  
Finally, CPA might impel information asymmetries. Firms may use council membership to 
increase corporate influence on public policy outcomes. By doing so, information asymmetries 
increase because it makes it more difficult to distinguish between corporate influence and policy 
outcomes. Therefore, firms might want to consider effects of information asymmetries in their 
political strategy and how these affect their business and stakeholder relation.  
4.3 Limitations  
The key limitations of this study are that events on presidential councils are novel CPA events even 
if only a small number of firms was involved. Therefore, the representativeness of empirical inference 
is questionable (limitations one, two, three) as well as the analyzed non-effect (limitations four, five).  
Firstly, there is only limited amount of past literature on presidential councils to draw an. 
Therefore, the empirical characterization and determination of councils is restricted because this 
master thesis´s inferences cannot be compared with prior research results on presidential councils.  
Secondly, the small sample size of this master thesis (n=30) may impede the assumption of 
normal distribution and can be influenced by outliers. Generally, event study methodology is based 
on large sample size accommodated with normal distribution. Therefore, McWilliams and Siegel 
(1997) claim that ‘bootstrap’ methods are a means to overcome the normality assumption. For the 
latter one, a nonparametric test (i.e. the binomial Z statistics) could be applied to account for outliers. 
Therefore, the general applicability of this master study might be limited.  
Thirdly, the current political and economic context of the US might confine the general 
applicability of this master thesis´s results. High uncertainty in the US political market as well as 
unclear future global positioning of the US (e.g. protectionism, withdrawal from Paris Climate 
Accord) might influence market reactions on presidential councils.  
Fourthly, results might be different if the council composition was comprised of firms from 
highly regulated industries only. In highly regulated industries, the government may exercise its 
power as a large customer on highly dependent firms so that changes in the composition of the 
presidential councils might influence firm performance more distinctively.  
Fifthly, results might diverge from this master thesis´s findings using other indicators than 
performance measures to analyze the effects of CPA. Instead of measuring abnormal stock price 
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changes, one could include firm reputation to measure effects of presidential councils. However, 
alternative measures analyze different changes and are more difficult to be retrieved in good quality 
as it is the case for stock price changes, but they might be more suitable.  
Sixthly, results might be different if confounding events are taken into consideration. For two 
council members, i.e. J.P. Morgan Chase and Blackstone Inc., there are events that have not been 
considered confounding events, so that both firms have been included in the analysis. However, 
results might be different if the two firms were excluded from the sample, precisely because the two 
were members of the Strategy and Policy Forum.  
4.4 Suggestions for future research 
Finally, this study suggests new dimensions for CPA and non-market strategy research. Firstly, future 
research might want to investigate underlying mechanisms of firm performance effects of CPA. 
Building upon Mellahi et al.´s (2016) suggestion, additional explaining attributes (e.g. consumer 
relation, stakeholder perception, brand image) can be considered to explain firm performance effects 
of CPA as well as inconclusive firm performance effects of prior research.  
Secondly, due to the councils´ nature, i.e. dependency on Presidential tenure, and novel 
character, research may want to incorporate historic councils. Considering the long tradition of 
councils advising the President´s administration, i.e. President Eisenhower´s ‘Foreign Intelligence 
Advisory Board’, there is data available to be investigated. A potential field of research are council 
meetings. These are significant events, attended by most council member firms and have important 
topics discussed. However, an event study requires new information to be released which may not 
hold in the light of council meetings. What future research could do is to include only those council 
meetings in the analysis that produce new information to the market  
Thirdly, future research may analyze firm performance effects of announcements of historic 
presidential councils. These announcements release new information to the markets and incorporate 
external opinion which turned out to be important for presidential councils. By incorporating historic 
councils into the analysis, the sample of firms increases, improving the representativeness of results.  
Fourthly, future research might want to explore firm performance effects of corporate 
statements´ order. The effect of Pepsi´s statement, for example, resulted in a positive CAR whereas 
following statements resulted in negative average CARs. Thus, future research might investigate the 
pioneer´s CAR and compare it to the followers´ CARs for each event, i.e. Muslim Travel Ban, 
withdrawal from Paris Climate Accord, and statements on Charlottesville demonstrations. 
Fifthly, future research may analyze investor reactions to the formation of presidential 
councils. According to Dahan (2005), firms are able to influence the political market if they are able 
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to control political resources such as brand image. However, council members have been confronted 
with negative publicity as well pressure from stakeholders, impairing their public image and 
questioning control over political resources. Instead, analyzing investor reactions at the time of 
formation, research may avoid hampered control over political resources and achieve different results.  
Sixthly, future research might want to use other measures than performance measures to analyze 
the effects of renunciations from presidential councils. Looking at the first renunciations, they were 
a means to express disagreement with current politics, whereas later renunciations followed strong 
external pressure to leave the councils. Therefore, intrinsic corporate motivation may have been 
different according to the timing of the renunciation, so that there might be dependent variables that 
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